Is the Nexus of Corporate and Public Financial Management Institutionalized in Special Purpose Entities? by Eger, Robert J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2012
Is the Nexus of Corporate and Public
Financial Management Institutionalized
in Special Purpose Entities?
Eger, Robert J.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41259






Robert J. Eger III 
Associate Professor of Accounting 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Ingersoll 214 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-7625 
Fax: (831) 656-3407 
Email: rjeger@nps.edu 
 
* I would like to acknowledge and thank participants at the 2012 Government Nonprofit Section Midyear Meeting 






A novel integration of public and corporate financial theory is used to model capital structure in 
special purpose organizations.  The expectation is that considering the similarities to corporate 
structure and managerial objectives these organizations will display evidence of an 
intergovernmental modified pecking order approach to capital structure.  The censored probit 
method suggests that special purpose entities follow an intergovernmental modified pecking 
order of capital structure, with correct classification in excess of eighty-nine percent.  The results 
support a direct link between intergovernmental revenue and the capital structure of the 
organization, providing insight into the tie between managerial costs and benefits.   
 
JEL: H77, H83, L91 




Since the 1980s, there has been a sweeping wave of organizational, managerial, 
accounting, and financial reform in the public sector (Christiaens and Rommel 2008). 
Undeniably, the wave has been striving for a rational economics-defined business point of view 
for governments, particularly toward information access to user groups with interest in the 
financial behavior of governments.  This wave has spawned literature in accounting, economics 
and finance with a focus on general purpose governments and school districts (see Jones and 
Pendlebury 1991; Mosso 1999; Harris 2005; Lee and Plummer 2007; Plummer, Hutchison, and 
Patton 2007).  Analyses have been presented based on the implications RIWKLVZDYH¶VLPSDFWRQ
the financial well-being of governments and the suitability of applying this economics-defined 
business point of view to governments.  Although rich in description of the financial 
management implications for governments, the theoretical bridge and conceptual framework of 
this view has been considered underwhelming (Hodges DQG 0HOOHWW  2¶'RQRYDQ 
Johnson and Lapsley 2005; Chan 2003; Premchand 2006; Guthrie 1998; Stanton and Stanton 
1998).   The public policy literature and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
have noted that governments lack conformity with the theoretical underpinnings of for-profit 
firms, driving a mismatch of the underlying motivation for governments to have similar financial 
behavior as for-profit firms (Box 1999; GASB 2013).  Currently, research has attempted neither 
to bridge this theoretical gap nor to apply the bridged theory to financial management of 
governmental organizations.       
The purpose of this paper is to bridge the theoretical gap through an integration of 
corporate and public financial management.  The application of this integrated theory provides 
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an opportunity to examine the capital structure of governmental special purpose entities (SPEs),1 
particularly public transportation SPEs.  Similar to the distinguishing characteristic of 
corporations, whether for-profit or nonprofit, an SPE is a separate legal entity autonomous from 
its owner (the establishing government) and its managers.  SPEs are established outside of the 
traditional government structure to provide self-supporting or revenue-producing public goods 
and services, which were often undertaken by private enterprises prior to the establishment of the 
SPE (Eger 2006).  Although an SPE¶V mission and power is defined by enabling legislation, an 
SPE is legally distinct from the establishing government 7KH63(¶Vmethod of operation for 
achieving its mission is beyond government control, regulations, and procedures typically 
applied to traditional government agencies and organizations.  SPEs have autonomous governing 
boards that are either elected or appointed and are endowed with the power to hire and fire 
employees, including a manager or chief executive officer.  These entities generate, manage, and 
report their own finances without oversight by the enabling government.  In addition, SPEs have 
the ability to issue debt leveraged against their own assets and earning power (not the full faith 
and credit of the establishing government) and to charge fees and rents for services rendered 
(Eger 2006; Eger and Feiock 2010).  Overall, these entities are self-governing and self-
supporting with financial resources and obligations that are entirely distinct from the establishing 
government.   
Many SPEs that provide public transportation services, which are the focus of this study, 
exhibit these decidedly corporate characteristics, providing a potential bridge between corporate 
and public financial behavior.  Public transportation SPEs are established to provide the market-
                                                 
1 Special purpose entities are defined by the U.S. Census of Governments by the QRPHQFODWXUH³VSHFLDOGLVWULFWV´
The U.S. Census of Governments identifies primary governments as composed of counties and subcounties 
PXQLFLSDOLWLHV WRZQV WRZQVKLSV HWF  6SHFLDO SXUSRVH JRYHUQPHQWV DUH FRPSRVHG RI ³VSHFLDO GLVWULFWV´ DQG
school districts.  Therefore, as found in the literature surrounding these governments, this study treats special 
purpose entities and special districts as synonymous. 
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oriented services of transit operations and transit infrastructure.  These public transportation 
SPEs have an oversight board.  These entities have the right to adopt a corporate name, make 
their own by-laws, and establish their own offices.  In addition, public transportation SPEs can 
file lawsuits against other entities and can be sued in their own entity name.  Most important, 
these entities have the power to generate funds from services and private money markets free 
from the political influences often exerted over government agencies (Smith 1990; Mitchell 
1991; Doig 1983; Walsh 1978).  
The intersection of corporate and public financial management may be seen to reside in 
the capital structure of SPEs.  The literature on capital structure is engaged in a debate that looks 
at the influence of capital structure and organizational performance.  Debt is known to leverage 
the return on the equity portion of a firm by maximizing potential profits, but debt payments are 
fixed, intensifying potential losses, forcing the equity holders to take on additional risk. The 
generally fixed debt payments increase certainty, which reduces the risk born by the creditors. In 
completely efficient markets the increased risk born by the owners is exactly offset by the risk 
reduction carried by the debt holders. Therefore, there is no financial incentive to use debt over 
HTXLW\0RGLJOLDQL DQG0LOOHU ZHUH WKH ILUVW WR WKHRUL]H WKDW WKH ILUP¶V FKRLFH EHWZHHQ
debt and other financing sources does not matter if the capital markets are completely efficient. 
In such conditions, the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure, as there 
would be no financial advantage to financing assets through debt or equity.  
The federal tax on corporate income treats debt and equity differently and therefore 
provides a financial incentive for a firm to prefer debt to equity (Myers 1984). Interest costs of 
debt are deductible for tax purposes while dividends are not. Taken to the limit, tax deductions 
for corporate interest payments would motivate firms to finance entirely with debt. However, the 
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cost of financial distress is a disincentive for using debt (Warner 1977; Weiss 1990). As debt 
outstanding increases, credit risk increases, causing creditors to increase interest rates and 
GHPDQGPRUHFROODWHUDOZKLFKGLPLQLVKHVWKHUHWXUQRQRZQHUV¶HTXity.  
For government organizations, the borrowing of money has occurred over centuries.  
Government borrowing in perfectly functioning markets, as postulated by Ricardo (1951), 
indicates that governments and citizens are indifferent between debt and other financing (taxes or 
equity).  This theoretical argument, similar to Modigliani and Miller (1958) in corporate finance, 
is that the mix of debt and other financing sources would not matter to the citizen/owner.  Similar 
to the empirical literature on corporate structure, the empirical literature indicates that the choice 
to issue debt in government affects the citizen/owner in multiple ways.   
Public debt distributes expenditures over future periods of time.  At issue is whether the 
issuance of debt shifts the tax burden from current taxpayers to future taxpayers, raising 
questions about the intergenerational equity of debt financing (Barro 1979; Buchanan 1958, 
1976).  In the empirical literature surrounding the issue of the debt illusion hypothesis, where 
voters underestimate the present value of debt and therefore view debt as less expensive than tax 
finance (Buchanan 1964), the results show that the costs of debt issuance is underestimated or 
even perceived as a benefit by voters (Dollery and Worthington 1995).  Even if citizens/owners 
are aware of future fiscal liabilities, citizens may still prefer bond to tax financing since 
government organizations are able to borrow at a lower interest costs than private individuals due 
to the tax benefits associated with the tax exemption of interest earnings at both the federal and 





  The background of capital structure implies a trade-off theory for capital structure.  This 
trade-off has been termed ³the pecking order theory´ based on the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argument that what drives the capital structure is asymmetric information. Information 
asymmetry occurs, in this theory, when managers know more than the rest of the market about 
WKHLU ILUP¶V YDOXH.  The market is shown to discipline the issuance of equity whose expected 
payoffs are significantly related to the assessment of such a value. The pecking order theory 
predicts that companies should use equity to cover financing deficits only as a last resort, after 
less expensive and less information-sensitive alternatives (like internal cash or debt) have been 
exhausted. 
Applying the intuition behind the pecking order theory with development from the public 
financial management literature to ensure applicability, the resulting empirical evaluation 
indicates that SPEs follow an intergovernmental modified pecking order approach to capital 
structure.  The modified pecking order approach can correctly classify over 89% of the SPEs¶ 
decisions to choose internal or external financing.  The approach indicates about a 19% 
LPSURYHPHQW RYHU WKH QDwYH PRGHO¶V classification accuracy.  A similar, albeit larger, 
improvement of 22% is found with the debt-local intergovernmental revenue (IGR) decision in 
which the empirical evaluation indicates a classification rate of about 83%.  The empirical 
outcomes support the notion that this modified pecking order may be applicable to SPEs.    
The remainder of the paper derives the structure for SPEs capital financing.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the data, presentation of the results, and the conclusion.  
Theory 
The intuition behind the theoretical model articulated in Myers and Majluf (1984) and 





AB  represents debt financing.  The capital structure order indicates that SPEs will finance 
investments with internal resources (cash and liquid assets), until available internal sources are 
exhausted at Point A.  The intuition underpinning this aspect of the capital investment strategy 
for governmental entities is offered in the public finance literature with a concentration 
associated with own-source revenues.  This literature indicates that own-source revenue is the 
primary means of establishing the ability to capital invest (Pagano 1990, 2002), a signal of 
symmetric information.  Demange (2009) demonstrates that own-source revenues underpin pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) government social investment, where spending of internal cash is dominant if 
the decisive voter can be made better off under self-sufficiency, without external assistance.  The 
exhausting of cash in PAYG is an important aspect in capital financing of state governments.  
Wang, Hou, and Duncome (2007) show that, for states, relaxing the assumptions of the Ricardo-
Barro equivalence theorem2 indicates a positive effect in state use of PAYG for infrastructure 
investments, partially attributable to the information symmetry underlying PAYG. Current 
empirical research supports the theoretical argument posited by Demange¶V (2009) finding that 
PAYG has sustainability properties in governments (Wang and Hou 2009; Wang, Hou, and 
Duncome 2007).  The PAYG ideal may be further represented by the policy decision to establish 
sinking funds, providing identification of set-aside revenues as a response to information 
asymmetry (Kurtenbach and Vijayakumar 1999).   
 
                                                 
2 In the literature, the Ricardo-Barro Equivalence Theorem operates on the following three assumptions: (1) a single 
rational agent, (2) a single benevolent social planner, and (3) neutrality of institutions. This ignores the 
intergenerational aspects of debt or the finite terms of the office holder in governments, leading to the critical 
assumption that both the agent and the government, a benevolent social planner- with the objective to maximize the 
welfare of the agent, have infinite time horizons. The agent knows that an increase in debt implies tax increases in 
the future and will adjust her bequests to offset the implied changes in future tax liabilities. Thus she is indifferent to 
the debt-tax choice because the two mechanisms are equivalent- debt (long-term) and taxation (current) has no 
differential impact on personal wealth (see Imbeau [2004] for complete analysis). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
Defining Point A is an important issue in SPEs.  If we assume a strict definition, then 
Point A is only achieved if all internal sources are completely exhausted.  If SPEs behave as the 
literature suggests, similar to both government agencies and nonprofits (see Axelrod 1992; Doig 
1983; Walsh 1978), then the complete exhaustion of internal sources may indicate a prohibited 
action by management, given that many governments and nonprofits have minimum cash reserve 
policies.  To accommodate for a cash reserve policy, this study defines Point A as follows: 
10 [  ( )]
S
it it it itInvestment Internal Sources uJ    ,     (1) 
where i  and t index SPEs and years, itu is a mean zero random variable, and 
1   it it itInternal Sources Fund Balances Cash Flow  .      (2) 
Equation (1) implies that SPEs will use internal sources to fund investment up to the point
( )Sit ituJ  .  This is the point at which the SPE has exhausted internal sources for investment 
conditional on the existing cash reserve policy, regardless if the policy is SPE imposed, 
regulatory (Mensah, Considine, and Oakes 1994), or donor imposed (Keating and Frumkin 
2003).  A strict definition would indicate that 0SitJ  ; however, the public finance literature 
indicates that stated policy is influential for financial decision making in public organizations, 
thereby relaxing the strict assumption. 
After exhausting internal sources, debt financing is then implied from Point A until 
reaching its exhaustion at Point B.  The majority of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
indicates that SPEs utilize their own full faith and credit to issue debt (Bennett and DiLorenzo 
1982, 1983, 1984; Marlow and Joulfaian 1989).  Although this stream of literature focuses on the 
amount of debt issued by SPEs, the consensus is that SPEs are a vehicle that provides capital 
infrastructure through the tax-exempt municipal debt market.  The implications of marketplace 
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information asymmetry are proposed in Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982) with the use of SPEs seen 
as vehicles to circumvent voter approval or awareness of state and local debt issuance.  A less 
adverse approach to SPEs is observed in Hildreth (1993), where SPEs are seen as a strategic 
choice, instead of a rational choice based on the information asymmetry between issuer, 
purchaser, and debtor (constituents) as indicated in Bennett and DiLorenzo (1982).  Although 
this sparse literature on SPEs points toward debt issuance outside the purview of the debtor 
(constituent), a discussion of the trade-off between own-source revenues and debt is not found 
outside of the research in Eger (2006) and Eger and Feiock (2010).  Eger (2006) and Eger and 
Feiock (2010) focus on the fact that SPEs are not directly governed by the constituent (debtor) 
through the traditional median-voter or political economy application.  In fact, no direct link is 
found politically between the financial behavior and the voter, with the exception of the indirect 
effect of the voter on the appointed oversight board structure of the SPE (Eger and Feiock 2010).        
The order defines the decision between internal sources and debt as  
1 









it it it itA Internal Sources uJ   .       (4) 
Equation (3) indicates the initial step of 0\HUVDQG0DMOXI¶Vpecking order: investment is 
funded by debt ( 1)External   if internal sources are insufficient to provide for the needed 
investment. 
The second threshold, B, is constructed as the point where 
1 10 (  ) ( ).
S D
it it it it it itInvestment Internal Sources u v DebtJ J             (5) 
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Equation (5) indicates that SPEs will exhaust their internal sources first and will issue debt in 
excess of their existing debt level, 1itDebt  , up to the point 
D
it itvJ  .  The interpretation of B is 
that B represents the sum of A and the amount of debt the SPE can issue conditional upon its 
existing debt level.  This allows an SPE to address debt management regardless of the 
underpinning of the debt level restriction, whether the restriction is self-imposed, regulatory, or 
debt market-imposed.  Using a strict interpretation would lead to the implication that DitJ  is 
infinite since an SPE would never seek to secure IGR as shown in Figure 1.  Research has 
indicated that the cost of financial distress is a disincentive for using debt (Warner 1977; Weiss 
1990). As debt outstanding increases, the credit risk increases, causing creditors to increase interest 
rates and demand more collateral.  This implies that DitJ  is an indicator of DQ63(¶VDELOLW\WRLVVXH
what is referred to DV ³VDIH GHEW´ WRPDLQWDLQ ³UHVHUYH ERUURZLQJ SRZHU´ (Myers 1984, 589), 
providing the outcome that .DitJ z f   
After exhausting both internal sources and debt, the SPE will turn to equity financing.  
SPEs cannot issue traditional equity capital, due to their structure. This does not mean that SPEs 
cannot turn to a market based robust equity capital market.  SPEs can turn to IGR, similar to 
turning to an equity capital market.  The IGR can be acquired from investors such as local, state, 
or federal governments. IGR acquisition follows a similar theoretical cost structure as the equity 
capital market. TKH63(PDQDJHU¶VIGR acquisition decision depends on how this decision will 
DIIHFW WKH 63(¶V LQYHVWPHQW FKRLFH DQG KRZ WKLV FKRLFH ZLOO in turn DIIHFW WKH 63(¶V SRVW-
investment financial condition. The SPE manager is attentive to the financial condition of the 
SPE immediately after she has invested using the IGR mechanism, while simultaneously 
assessing WKH63(¶VORQJ-term financial condition. ThHLQWHUJRYHUQPHQWDOUHDFWLRQWRWKH63(¶V
investment decision depends on whether the intergovernmental investor (local, state, or federal 
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government) endorses the decision or thinks it is a poor idea. To the degree that the SPE manager 
can anticipate the agreement between what she thinks is a good project and what the 
intergovernmental investors think is a good project, she forms an expectation about how the 
financial condition of the SPE will react when she makes her investment decision. It is this 
expectation that drives the IGR decision. The central issue is the degree of agreement observed 
in the PDQDJHU¶VILQDQFLQJchoice. 
The costs associated with the IGR choice are explored within the fiscal federalism 
aspects of public finance.  As noted by Oates (2008) and Volden (2007), the allocation of IGR is 
undertaken within a competitive market for these funds.  Volden (2007) advances a model of 
intergovernmental competition in which politicians seek to claim credit for providing popular 
goods, avoiding responsibility for the taxation necessary to pay for such goods, and to advance 
their policy agendas.  The model predicts conditions under which the competition for IGR is 
specifically tied to the nature of the policy costs placed by the IGR supplier on the IGR recipient, 
providing some game theoretic detail of when intergovernmental recipients will seek the capital 
and how their spending levels are affected.  The extant literature on local intergovernmental 
behavior and higher order governmentVVXSSRUWV9ROGHQ¶Vargument.  This literature is grounded 
in traditional fiscal federalism, where information asymmetry is a key component to 
intergovernmental behavior.  Inman (1979) suggest that grants from other levels of government 
affect communities¶ fiscal decisions differently than own-source revenues, due to asymmetric 
information.  The exploration of evidence of an asymmetric information response and allocation 
to intergovernmental capital is present in the empirical and theoretical literature (Stine 1984; 
Gamkhar and Oates 1996; Volden 1999; Gamkhar 2000).  Craig and Inman (1982), who examine 
the contemporaneous relationship between grants and spending, have noted that since matching 
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grants have price effects, they cannot simply be combined together with lump sum grants to form 
a single grants variable.  This will lead the SPE to focus on local IGR as it represents a non-
matching grant outcome.  
 The decision between debt and local IGR in the framework is  







­ t ® d ¯       (6)
 
where  
1 1(  ) ( ).
S D
it it it it it it itB Internal Sources u v DebtJ J        
Equation (6) dictates that investment be financed with debt once the needed investment exceeds 
the available internal sources.  At and beyond itB , SPEs will turn to local IGR capital.   
Within the framework for SPEs, assume that managers of SPEs are better informed than 
intergovernmental capital providers²an assumption also made by Myers and Majluf (1984).  




it it it it itB Internal Sources Debt vJ      ,     (7) 
where *D S Dit it itJ J J  and *it it itv u v  .  Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3) discloses the 
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it it it it ity Investment Internal Sources uJ         (9) 
Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (6) indicates that the decision between debt and local 







1 y 0          





­ t ® ¯ ,       (10) 
where  
* * *
2 1 1 .
D
it it it it it ity Investment Internal Sources Debt vJ          (11) 
Following Leary and Roberts (2010), the error terms *itu  and
*
itv  are assumed to be 
distributed bivariate standard normal with correlation U , resulting in a model that is a censored 
bivariate probit.  The observable data are governed by the sign of the two latent variables *1ity and
*
2 ity  with the magnitude of the two latent variables seen as inconsequential.  The specification in 
Equations (9) and (11) imposes, as found in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the strict theory 
restriction that the slope coefficients on Investmentit, Internal Sourcesit-1, and Debtit-1 are each 
equal to one.  Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) recognize the tradeoff between 
adverse selection costs and the costs of financial distress when too much debt is issued. Under 
this version of the theory, organizations may issue equity in place of debt when faced with a 
financing deficit to maintain both liquid assets and debt capacity for future investments. 
Therefore, as noted in Leary and Roberts (2010), this modified version requires a less restrictive 
condition, which is the equality of the coefficients in their respective equations.  This is a similar 
restriction found in previous studies (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Frank and Goyal 2003; 
Lemmon and Zender 2004; Leary and Roberts 2010).  This study follows the prior empirical 
evaluations across time and organizations, assuming that the SPEs will be heteroskedastic and 
15 
 
correlated.  Thus, all continuous variables are scaled using population served3 (Wooldridge 
2002).      
To stay consistent with the corporate literature (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Chen and 
Zhao 2003; Hovakimian 2006; Korajczyk and Levy 2003; Leary and Roberts 2005; Leary and 
Roberts 2010), debt is defined as total debt from period t-1 to t, and local intergovernmental 
capital is defined as local IGR from period t-1 to t.  To normalize the data, this study uses 
population served in t-1.  Consistent with the prior literature, SPEs that neither issue debt nor 
receive local IGR are assumed to have used internal sources to fund all investments.    
Data  
 
Financial data on cash, debt, and IGR for transportation SPEs is not directly available.  
To address the lack of centralized data, this study combines two data sources.  The first source of 
data is the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Governments from 1997-2006.  Although the 
comprehensive Census of Governments occurs every five years, the U.S. Census Bureau 
randomly samples SPEs for the non-census years.   
In the Census of Governments data, SPEs are identified through the nomenclature 
³VSHFLDO GLVWULFW JRYHUQPHQWV´ As defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, special district 
governments are independent, special purpose governmental units that exist as separate entities 
with substantial administrative and fiscal independence from general purpose governments.  To 
be identified as a special district government, rather than be classified as a subordinate 
governmental agency, an entity must possess three attributes: existence as an organized entity, 
                                                 
3 Other analyses have corrected these issues using total assets as the scalar.  Since total assets are not consistent 




governmental character,4 and substantial autonomy.5  The Census of Governments data is 
primarily used to assess the financial status of the transit SPEs.  The second data source comes 
from the National Transit Database (NTD) provided by the Federal Transit Administration, U.S. 
Department of Transportation.  This database includes data pertaining to all transit entities, 
including special districts as defined by the Census of Governments and subordinate agencies of 
state and local governments.  This data source was used primarily to assess population served, 
density, board membership, and passenger usage. These two data sets do not have common 
identifiers for the transit SPEs.  To address the lack of common identifiers between the data sets, 
a crosswalk was established based on the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) and 
the transit identification number (TRS ID).  Additionally, the NTD is presented in the full 
accrual accounting basis since 1993.  However, the Census of Governments does not require 
information to be reported on a full accrual accounting basis.  To address this lack of a common 
accounting basis, all information gathered was manually checked against each HQWLW\¶V 
comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) to assure a common full accrual accounting basis 
for all data.  All revenue and spending data are in 1997 constant dollars and normalized on per 
capita served.  
                                                 
4 Governmental character is implied when officers of the entity are popularly elected or appointed by public 
officials.  A high degree of organizational responsibility to the public is also evidence of governmental character, 
which can be demonstrated by requirements for public reporting or for accessibility of records to public inspection.  
Governmental character can be met if either the requirement regarding officers or public accountability is fulfilled.  
Therefore, the Census of Governments attributes this character to any entity having power to levy taxes, power to 
issue debt that pays interest exempt from federal taxation, or responsibility for performing a function commonly 
regarded as governmental in nature. 
5 An entity is determined to have substantial autonomy when it has fiscal and administrative independence, subject 
to statutory limitations by a state or local government.  An entity is fiscally independent when its budget is 
determined without being subjected to review and detailed modification by local officials or governments.  
)XUWKHUPRUHILVFDOLQGHSHQGHQFHLQFOXGHVWKHHQWLW\¶VDELOLW\WROHY\WD[HVIRULWVVXSSRUWWRIL[DQGFROOHFWFKDUJHV
for its services, or to issue debt without review by another local government.  Administrative independence is 
closely tied to the VHOHFWLRQRI WKHHQWLW\¶VJRYHUQLQJERG\ $GPLQLVWUDWLYH LQGHSHQGHQFH LVGHWHUPLQHGZKHQ WKH
entity has a popularly elected governing body or has a governing body representing two or more state or local 
governments.  Administrative independence can also occur with an appointed governing body, if it performs 
functions that are essentially different from, and are not subject to, specification by its enabling government. 
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This study uses all transportation SPEs identified by the U.S. Census as special districts, 
with service populations of at least 50,000, and sampled during the entire time period 1996-2006, 
for inclusion in the analysis.6  These criteria yielded a sample size of 70 transportation SPEs, 
which represents 25% of all mass transit entities reported in the 1997 Census of Governments.7   
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the SPEs.  The largest percentage (41%) of 
financing decisions for SPEs rely on internal funds, followed by debt (37%), and finally by local 
IGR (22%).  A very small minority, less than 1%, uses both debt and local IGR.  Average SPE 
characteristics are presented for each financing event.  There is little difference between the 
average ages of the SPEs for the financing decisions.  A characteristic that appears troubling is 
that SPEs using local IGR financing indicate an average negative fund balance while their 
average cash and securities balance appears similar to SPEs using internal financing.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Results 
In the empirical models, a set of controls are included that influence the decision of SPEs 
through market or government imposition.  As described in Bertomeu, Beyer, and Dye (2011), it 
LV XQGHVLUDEOH WR WDNH DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V ILQDQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV DV JLYHQ VLQFH WKH RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
financing decisions change based on disclosure choices.  Given that SPE disclosure is both 
market- and government-imposed, this study controls for disclosure choice by controlling for 
each 63(¶VVWDWHGVLQNLQJIXQGSROLF\ similar to Dunn and Spatt (1984), use of its taxing ability, 
its current interest costs, and passenger miles. Empirical tests of the positive relation between 
disclosed information and the cost of capital can be found in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O¶Hara 
                                                 
6 Transportation SPEs with a service population of less than 50,000 are not required to report information to the 
National Transit Database.    
7 7KH&HQVXVRI*RYHUQPHQWVLGHQWLILHG³VSHFLDOGLVWULFW´JRYHUQPHQWV2IWKHVHZHUHLGHQWLILHG
as mass transit entities. 
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(2002) who focus on the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders and 
Botosan (1997) who focuses on the quantity of annual report information.   
An additional set of controls, both federal and state IGR, is used to address the concern of 
the receipt of matching grant intergovernmental capital.  Niskanen (1968, 1971, 1979) argues 
that government organizations are influenced by matching grant funds, where influence can 
affect both the use of internal revenues and debt issuance. This potential effect is addressed by 
controlling for matching grants.  The control of federal and state IGR is not similar to Stafford¶V 
(2001) substitution effect where firms substitute funds raised in the capital market for internal 
funds.  The findings in Stafford (2001) would not affect the empirical implications, given that it 
does not alter the structural proposition of the hypothesis.  Following Leary and Roberts (2010),       
SPEs will avoid external capital (debt) when investment needed is less than A and will avoid 
local IGR when investment need is less than B.  
To measure the ability of the theory to explain financing decisions for SPEs, the study 
estimates Equations (8) through (11) using maximum likelihood.  Panel A of Table 2 presents the 
predictive accuracies of each of the models specified.  Panels B and C of Table 2 present the 
corresponding internal-external and debt-local IGR equation parameter estimates for each of the 
three specified models. As noted in Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (2001), the focus is on 
the debt-equity decision, which is operationalized as a debt-local IGR decision for SPEs.  It is 
this decision that will receive the primary attention in this study.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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To measure the explanatory power of the theory in the financing decisions of SPEs, a naïve 
model8 is estimated that indicates 71.3% of the internal-external decisions and 63.8% of the debt-
local IGR decisions are accurately classified. Models I through III indicate that the accuracy of 
the internal-external decision increases to greater than 89% and the debt-local IGR decision 
increases to about 83%, when incorporating controls that are effectively indicated under market 
RUJRYHUQPHQWLPSRVLWLRQDVXEVWDQWLDOLPSURYHPHQWRYHUWKHQDwYHPRGHO$OWKRXJK0RGHO,¶V
debt-local IGR decision ignores any fixed effects of time, location, or board influence, Models II 
and III, which include these fixed effects, do not provide any overall apparent improvement in 
the accuracy of the predictions.  As found in Leary and Roberts (2010), the use of a censored 
bivariate probit appears supported with the correlation of the error terms, identified as U , 
estimated at 0.68 and highly statistically significant in the empirical model (p-value .001).   
The lack of an influence of the fixed effects, particularly the board, is consistent with 
Eger and Feiock (2010) where the implications of board structure and composition on fiscal 
performance of sub-municipal organizations did not influence the usage of revenue sources, 
regardless of the services provided by the SPEs.  The fixed effect outcome follows the literature 
of Deno and Mehay (1987), Hayes and Chang (1990), and Campbell and Turnbull (2003), 
finding minimal or no effect on financial behavior between different forms of government.  This 
finding is counter to work by Turnbull and Geon (2006), which indicates, in a principal-agent 
framework, that appointed officials are more cost conscious because they are less concerned with 
politics and less influenced by interest groups. The fixed effect outcomes are consistent with 
Leary and Roberts (2010) for time and are consistent with Leary and Roberts (2010) and Frank 
                                                 
8 The naïve model is based on a guess in which one could always predict the more common outcome and be right 
the majority of the time, without knowing anything about the predictors.  
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and Goyal¶V (2009) empirical outcomes regarding firm characteristics as determinants of 
corporate capital structure.   
Turning the attention to the parameter outcomes, the probability of using external funds 
and local IGR are positively correlated with the financing deficit that is captured by the PO 
variable (noted as 0.0059 and 0.0002 in Panels B and C respectively in Model I).  The positive 
correlation for PO holds consistently across all the specified models. The initial sign for SJ in 
Model I seems counterintuitive since it represents the mean level of cash holdings for 
transportation SPEs which should be strictly positive.  However, as noted in the literature on 
governmental finance and accounting, it is possible for governments to have temporarily 
negative cash holdings, which can increase taxes (Gore 2006).  In general, the controls for 
disclosure and matching grants are statistically significant.  All three models indicate a positive 
relationship between matching grants and the financing decisions of SPEs.  The debt-local IGR 
decision in Model I indicates that neither taxing ability nor interest costs statistically impact the 
decision.  That said, the results show that interest costs are always negatively related to the 
decision, and the ability to tax is always positive across the models, an outcome that is intuitively 
consistent.   
Conclusion 
The interest in the financial behavior of SPEs, centered on their corporate-like structure, 
leads to a proposition that their financing decisions would follow their organizational structure.  
Using a novel interaction between public and corporate financial decisions, the resulting 
theoretical application and empirical assessment provide a look at the financial decisions of these 
governmental organizations using the intuition underlying the theory.  To assure applicability, 
the theoretical presentation incorporates the public finance literature along with the fiscal 
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federalism literature to assess the foundation of local intergovernmental revenue as a form of 
equity.  The resulting empirical evaluation shows that these groups of SPEs follow what could be 
termed an intergovernmental pecking order approach to capital structure.  The approach can 
correctly classify over 89% of the SPEs¶ financing decisions between choosing internal or 
external financing and about 83% of debt-local IGR financing decisions.  The theoretical and 
empirical outcomes support the notion that this intergovernmental pecking order approach may 
be applicable to governmental organizations.  Finally, although their enabling governments may 
subsidize transportation SPEs through matching grants, financial decision making appears to be 
more independent than thought.   
This study has limitations, however.  Most significant is that although a random sample 
of transportation SPEs was obtained, the applicability to all SPEs has not been assessed in this 
study.  Thus, unlike the revenue and expenditure analysis of differing types of SPEs found in 
Eger and Feiock (2010), the broader application of the intergovernmental pecking order to all 
SPEs may be limited.  This limitation may be addressed as future research explores the financial 
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Internal 40.9% 30.6  76.7  59.7  5.5  28.3  
Debt 36.9% 18.2  44.6  29.2  1.0  28.3  
Local IGR 21.6% 37.2  75.1  45.8  (6.2) 30.2  
Debt & Local IGR 0.6% 79.3  107.4  76.0  (8.9) 29.5  
The sample is drawn from the Census of Governments with all variables normalized by population served with the 
exception of age.  Debt issuance is defined as a change in total debt (long-term + short-term) from year t-1 to t 
divided by population served.  Local IGR in year t is defined as local IGR in t minus local IGR in t-1.  Investments 
are defined as the sum of capital outlays plus investments in year t; Cash balance is defined as cash and marketable 
securities in year t; Cash flow for year t is defined as net change in cash and cash equivalents; Fund balance is 
defined as unrestricted net assets in t-1; age is defined as the number of years since a given SPE was established by 





Table 2: Parameter Estimates 
Panel A: Prediction Accuracy 
   
 
Model I Model II Model III 
Internal  89.78% 90.65% 90.79% 
External 90.12% 91.52% 90.48% 
Correctly Classified 89.86% 90.86% 90.71% 
    Debt 83.04% 82.79% 82.93% 
Local IGR 84.43% 84.17% 85.00% 
Correctly Classified 83.29% 83.02% 83.29% 
    Panel B: Parameter 
Estimates  
Internal -External Decision Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant ( )SJ  -2.5017 -8.25 0.1413 8.07 0.1476 6.99 
PO 0.0059 5.26 0.0063 5.28 0.0064 5.34 
Sinking Fund 0.8314 3.99 0.7956 3.84 0.8140 3.95 
Taxing Ability 0.2530 1.87 0.4512 2.45 0.4652 2.49 
Interest -0.9114 -3.25 -0.9181 -3.51 -0.9461 -3.09 
Passenger Miles 0.0062 6.26 0.0067 6.06 0.0069 6.43 
Federal IGR 0.0547 4.21 0.0568 4.17 0.0568 4.24 
State IGR 0.0097 2.15 0.0098 2.21 0.0100 2.27 
Panel C: Parameter 
Estimates  
Debt -Local IGR Decision 
      
 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant ( )D SJ J  -2.4917 -8.24 -0.1014 -8.05 -0.0979 -6.98 
PO 0.0002 3.44 0.0001 2.88 0.0001 2.99 
Sinking Fund 0.8577 4.08 0.7953 3.83 0.8140 3.95 
Taxing Ability 0.2046 1.50 0.4481 2.43 0.4624 2.46 
Interest -0.9512 -1.33 -0.9230 -3.52 -0.9556 -2.84 
Passenger Miles 0.0062 6.23 0.0067 6.05 0.0069 6.41 
Federal IGR 0.0542 4.19 0.0566 4.16 0.0567 4.19 
State IGR 0.0097 2.15 0.0097 2.20 0.0100 2.27 
The sample is drawn from the Census of Governments with all variables normalized by population served.  The 
table presents the prediction accuracy results and parameter estimates for the censored bivariate probit. PO is 
defined in Panel B as Investment minus Internal Funds in the External equation and in Panel C as Investment 
minus Internal Funds plus Debt in the Local IGR equation.  Sinking Fund is defined as 1 if an SPE has a sinking 
fund policy and 0 if it does not; Taxing Ability is defined as 1 if the SPE has taxed its population served and 0 if it 
does not; Interest is defined as Interest Expense in year t divided by Total Debt in year t; Passenger Miles is 
defined as the total number of  miles traveled by the SPE¶s physical assets in year t; Federal IGR is defined as 
federal intergovernmental matching revenue in year t; and State IGR is defined as state intergovernmental 
matching revenues in year t.  Fixed effects are identified by three variables, Region as defined by the U.S. Census, 
Time, and Board as defined by the Census of Governments.  I(x) is defined as an indicator variable.  
Model I is defined in Panel B as: 
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Model II in Panel B as: 
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Model III in Panel B as: 
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Models I±III in Panel C are defined identically to Panel B with LocalIGRit as the left-hand side variable and (ȖD- ȖS) 
as the constant. 
 
